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THE CONCEPT OF PERSON
In the preceding chapter I have shown that though this standard arguments against Cartesian dualism are difficult to meet yet this has not led to a complete rejection of dualism. The dualism of mental and physical states still remains as it is.
I wish to see in my thesis whether some form of dualism is inevitable in trying to make sense of the human reality.
And, if it is so, what accounts for its inevitability'? Is it some feature of the mental itself or is it a feature of our conceptual framework as a whole?
One important difficulty with the mind-body problem is the problem of understanding the concept of a person.
There are two different sorts of existences namely 'mental' and the 'physical'. The physicalist or the materialist believe that matter is the only reality and the whole universe is made of matter, and thus a person too. For the physicalist or materialists 'person is a body' while for the Rationalists the person is mind. For some philosophers 129 mutually exclusive properties. He held that there are some properties such as weight, height, colour, shape, etc.
which are more or less permanent attributes, which can only be ascribed to bodies. There are another set of properties such as thinking, feeling, willing, or consciousness which can only be ascribed to mind. Descartes argues here that if we ascribe/attribute both sets of properties or qualities to the samething, there would be a linguistic illusion.
But it should not be ignored here that Descartes conception of mind as something private, immaterial, invisible, etc.
has made mind as something mysterious. And therefore, this ^mysterious' conception of mind has led Moritz Schlik, Wittgenstein, and others to think that this mysterious mind, as advocated by Descartes, is really not capable of owning all our experiences. For them, mind is something like an unexplained thing which is anything but mysterious.
As per the logic of the no-ownership theory (a view discussed "It is not coherent, m that one who holds it is forces to use of that sense of possession of which he denies the existence, m presenting this case for the denial. When he tries to state the contingent fact, which he thinks gives rise to the illusion of the ^ego', he has to state it m some such form as ^All my experiences are had, by (i.e. uniqualy dependent on the state of) boy B' . For any attempt to eliminate the ^my' or any expression with a similar possessive force, would yeield something that was not a contingent fact at all. The proposition that all experience are causally dependent on the state of a single body B, for example, it is 3ust false. The theorist means to 13: speak of all the experiences had by a certain person being contingently so dependent. And the theorist cannot consistently argue that ^all the experiences of person P' means the samethmg as ^all experiences contengently dependent on a certain body B', for then his proposition would not be contingent as his theory requires, but analytic. He must mean to be speaking of some fact contingently true that they are all dependent on body B. The defining characteristics of this class is m fact that they are 'my experiences' or 'the experiences of some person' , where the idea possession expressed by 'my' and 'of , is the one he calls into question". ' To put it concisely a person is a compound of two diverse kinds of subjects: a subject of experience, for instance pure ego, and subject of corporeal, characteristics, for instance, body. In order to avoid any further difficulty we should rather say, Strawson suggests, a person consists of a ^subject' and a 'non-subject. And this primitive concept of a person frees us from the difficulties of both Cartesian and the no-ownership theory. Strawson further makes a distinction between 'M-perperties' and 'P-perperties' which he thinks are equally applicable to a person. He writes: "There would be no question of ascribing one's own states of consciousness, or experiences, to anything, unless one also ascribed, or were ready and able to ascribe, states of consciousness, or experiences, other individual entities of the same logical type as that thing to which one ascribes one's own states of consciousness. The condition of reckoning oneself as a subject of such predicates is that one should also reckon others as subjects of such predicates. The condition m turn, of this being possible, IS that one should be able to distinguish from one another, to pick out or mdentify, different sub3ects of such predicates, i.e. different individuals of the type concerned. The condition m turn, of this being possible is that the individual concerned, including oneself, should be of a certain unique type: of a type, namely, such that to each individual of that type there must be ascribed, or ascribable, both states of consciousness and corporeal characteristics.
But this characterization of the type is still very opaque and doesnot at all clearly brings out what is involved. To bring this out, I must make a rough division, into two, of the kind of predicates properly applied to individuals of this type. The first kind of predicate consists of those whjch are also properly applied to material bodies to which we would not dream of applying predicates ascribing states of consciousness. I will call the first kind Mpredicates: and they include things like Veighs 10 stone' , '*is m the drawing-room' and so on. The second kind consists of all the other predicates. P-predicates, of course, will be very various. They will include things like ^is smiling', 'is going for a walk', as well as things like ''is m pain', ''is thinking hard', 'believes m God' and so on".' "But suppose that we say that persons are just picked out as those to which (as well as M-predicates) any P-predicate is ascribable. Then material bodies will be those things to which no P-predicate is ascribable. And we both M-predicates and some P-predicates are ascribable, namely other animals. And this point seems to me to show a difficulty m Strawson's approach which is not merely minor. Strawson's view was. it seemSf that the concept of aperson was unique in admitting the joint ascription to things that fall under it of the two sorts of predicates, and this seems important to his thesis in terms of the explications he gives of the possibility of such joint ascription which connect that possibility intimately with the possibility of self ascription. There must, it now seems, be something wrong with this, and if the concept of a person is, with regard to the ascription of the two sorts of predicates, primitive, then it looks as though there will have to be other such primitive concepts, or at least on such" .'^ According to Strawson the concept of a person is logically primitive and irreducible kind of thing to whom two kinds of properties are ascribed. He argues that the concept of a person is not that of emljodied mind, or animated body, and therefore, it is not to be understood in terms of minds and bodies. For Strawson M-predicates are those predicates which are ascribable both to person and to material objects, like
•"is tall', '^is heavy', ^weighs 10 kg', etc. P-predicates are those which are ascribable to persons and in certain cases to other anin ^ s other than human beings, for example, 'is thinking', 'is watching television', 'is in pain', etc.
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And it IS the peculiarity of this P-properties (predicates) which appear to distinguish person from inanimate things.
And consequently, it is not wise to talk of properties shared by all material things and properties peculiar to human beings m terms of ''mental' and ^physical' properties.
Thus, the distinction between mental and physical properties is not equivalent to the distinction between M-properties and P-properties.
On the contrary, it may be mentioned that Descartes made a distinction between mental and physical as the two distinct and material body but for Descartes there is no such distinction, as it appears to our understanding.
In his book "What is a Person?' Mrinal Miri comments:
"It must, however, be admitted that for Descartes a doctrine of category distinction between mind and body was more a matter of implicit, half formulated assumption, than one of explicit concern".'' Strawson's distinction between M-predicates and Ppredicates is not as clear as it should have been. This can be said so because there are some predicates which donot fit nicely into either groups of predicates. For instances, there are certain biological predicates like "is growing', 6. Miri, Mrinal, What is a person'^, Shri Publishing House, Delhi, India, 1980, p. 7. 'is mature', 'is an adult', etc. are the predicates which donot fit well into either of the groups. If we say that 'a tree is growing' is an M-predicate but when we apply it to a human being it is P-predicate. But this difficulty m
Strawson's theory can be simply ignored by concentrating on that M-predicates are matter-involving and P-predicates On the other hand, dualism of mind-body in some form remains conceptually alive. By conceptual distinction we mean the fact that in our language mental concepts and physical concepts are incommensurate. At the sametime, it doesnot imply that both mental and physical have two distinct kinds of being. That is, their ontological status remains uncertain. Conceptually, the distinction remains. But whether a parallel ontological distinction can also be made is a question which remains largely unsettled. Concepts donot pick out anything. A concept is satisfied when it picks out an object of reality, for example, trees, chairs, etc.
contrary to these there are concepts like the concept of pure sponteneity or absolute freedom. Now, is there any sponteneous action to satisfy this concept?
Mental concepts cannot be reduced to non-mental concepts.
But the question that mental concepts pick out something in reality is a separate question. It is an empirical question, a factual one.
